A Game‐Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies
构建了一个利益集团与政策制定者之间的合作博弈模型，强调政策与谈判力量的相互依存关系，并推导了经济环境变化下的比较静态分析。通过塞内加尔食品和农业价格政策的政治经济学分析，展示了该框架的应用。
Abstract Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependence between policies and players' bargaining strengths and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. It also provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.