Self-Selection and the Pricing of Bank Services: An Analysis of the Market for Loan Commitments and the Role of Compensating Balance Requirements
运用信息不对称理论分析银行贷款承诺市场，解释为何银行使用费用和补偿性余额等支付选项，并探讨该分析对其他银行服务定价的启示。
The idea that various characteristics of financial contracts and institutions can be explained as a rational response to problems created by information asymmetries has received a great deal of attention recently. A central theme of the literature in this area is that while moral hazard may hamper the direct transfer of information between market participants, information may be conveyed indirectly through the actions of market participants. For example, the characteristics of the insurance contract purchased may convey information as to riskiness of the insured. Recognition of the possible effects of information asymmetries has provided valuable insights into the role of financial intermediaries and the characteristics of the contracts they offer. In this paper we apply this literature to an analysis of the market for bank loan commitments. Through our analysis we are able to explain the use of various payment options such as fees and compensating balance requirements associated with loan commitments. Extensions of our analysis into the pricing of other bank services are also explored.