Internal Capital Markets and Firm‐Level Compensation Incentives for Division Managers
研究多部门公司如何设计部门经理的薪酬合同，以缓解内部资本市场中的激励问题。发现薪酬与投资激励存在替代关系：部门经理薪酬与公司业绩挂钩越强，部门投资对盈利能力的敏感度越低。
Do multidivisional firms structure compensation contracts for division managers to mitigate incentive problems in their internal capital markets? I find evidence that compensation and investment incentives are substitutes: firms providing a stronger link to firm performance in incentive compensation for division managers also provide weaker investment incentives through the capital budgeting process. Specifically, as the proportion of incentive pay for division managers that is based on firm performance increases, division investment is less responsive to division profitability. These findings are generally consistent with a model of influence activities by division managers in interdivisional capital allocation decisions.