The Microsoft Case: What Can a Dominant Firm Do to Defend Its Market Position?
分析了微软在与网景的浏览器大战中的竞争行为，包括免费赠送浏览器、将其集成到Windows系统以及付费给在线服务商以获取独家分销，并探讨这些行为是否滥用市场支配地位。
This paper examines the competitive actions taken by Microsoft in its “browser war” with Netscape, most importantly Microsoft's decisions to give away Explorer free of charge, integrate Explorer into its dominant Windows operating system and pay online service providers for exclusive distribution. Consumers benefited significantly from these actions, but the fundamental economic question is whether Microsoft abused its existing market power when competing in this way. A detailed analysis of Microsoft's conduct and the economics of competition for distribution suggests that severe limits placed on Microsoft's behavior would not be welfare.