Determinants of CEO Pay: A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms
比较ExecuComp数据库内外的公司，发现前者规模更大、更复杂，其CEO现金薪酬更依赖盈利和股票回报，且机构持股集中度与股票期权价值的关系更强，说明两类公司处于不同的契约环境。
ABSTRACT: We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support for three predictions. First, ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns in determining CEO cash compensation. Second, the weight on earnings is more sensitive to differences in the extent of growth opportunities for ExecuComp firms. Third, the positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the value of stock option grants is stronger for ExecuComp firms. Overall, our results suggest that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms operate in different contracting environments that lead to differences in the design of their executive compensation contracts. As a result, care should be taken in extending results based on ExecuComp samples to non-ExecuComp firms.