Trade Disclosure Regulation in Markets with Negotiated Trades
研究做市商市场中公开交易细节的完全及时披露对风险厌恶投资者福利的影响，发现透明度改善数量风险分担但恶化价格修正风险分担，因此没有一种制度明确更优。
In dealership markets disclosure of size and price of details of public trades is typically incomplete. We examine whether full and prompt disclosure of public-trade details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor. We analyze a model of dealership market where a market maker first executes a public trade and then offsets her position by trading with other market makers. We distinguish between quantity risk and price revision risk. We show that if the market maker learns some information about the motive behind public trade, neither regime is unambiguously welfare superior. This is because greater transparency improves quantity risk sharing but worsens price revision risk sharing.