Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent
比较了专利发明者通过固定费用或单位提成方式向寡头行业许可一项降低成本发明时能获得的利润，发现固定费用许可对发明者和消费者都更优。
We compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost-reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product, by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n + 1 players: the inventor and the n firms. In this game the inventor acts as a Stackelberg leader, and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers. Only a "drastic" innovation is licensed to a single producer.