Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
探讨合同的不完全性是否源于其书面形式要求，通过将状态依存合同建模为算法映射，证明算法性质本身不足以导致不完全合同，但结合缔约方选择过程的类似限制时，会产生内生的最优不完全合同。
This paper explores the extent to which the incompleteness of contracts can be attributed to their formal nature: the form, usually written, that contracts are required to take to be enforceable in a court of law by legal prescription, common practice, or simply the contracting parties' will. We model the formal nature of state-contingent contracts as the requirement that the mapping from states of the world to the corresponding outcomes must be of an algorithmic nature. It is shown that such algorithmic nature, although by itself is not enough to generate incomplete contracts, when paired with a similar restriction on the contracting parties' selection process yields endogenously incomplete optimal contracts.