The Political Economy of Public-Private Compensation Differentials: The Case of Federal Pensions
研究了1920年《联邦雇员退休法》的历史，指出联邦雇员的寻租行为无法解释该法的特征，反而表明该法是国会与公务员之间的最优激励契约，公务员以接受强制退休和补偿性工资差异换取联邦养老金计划。
Numerous empirical studies indicate that, as a result of rent-seeking behavior, public-sector workers are overcompensated relative to their private-sector counterparts, with pensions representing part of the difference. I present a history of the Federal Employees Retirement Act of 1920 and show that rent seeking by federal workers cannot explain several features of the act. Instead, I argue that the act represented an optimal incentive contract between Congress and civil service employees in which civil servants accepted mandatory retirement and a compensating wage differential in exchange for the federal pension plan.