Exit in Duopoly under Uncertainty
研究衰退双寡头市场中企业何时退出的问题，用几何布朗运动刻画不确定性，分析马尔可夫完美均衡的独特性及其受不确定性和企业不对称程度的影响。
This paper examines a declining duopoly, where the firms must choose when to exit from the market. The uncertainty is modeled by letting the revenue stream follow a geometric Brownian motion. We consider the Markovperfect equilibrium in firms’ exit strategies. With a low degree of uncertainty there is a unique equilibrium, where one of the fi rms always exits before the other. However, when uncertainty is increased, another equilibrium with the reversed order of exit may appear ruining the uniqueness. Whether this happens or not depends on the degree of asymmetry in the firm specifi cp arameters.