Optimal Production Tax and Quota under Time Consistent Trade Policies
研究动态框架下进口国使用生产与贸易政策的激励和福利影响，发现生产税与配额均衡不等价，且取决于贸易政策工具是关税还是配额。
Abstract This article investigates the policy active importers' incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade policies in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not equivalent, and that each equilibrium depends on whether the trade policy instruments are tariffs or quotas. Under import quotas, the equilibrium policy is to tax domestic production, whereas under a tariff either a production tax or subsidy may be optimal. We also show that a collective agreement to ban production policies is likely to be welfare‐improving in many circumstances.