The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation
在一个委托人与两个代理人存在逆向选择和合谋的模型中，研究发现委托人将分包权授权给一个代理人总是比集中签约利润更低；若代理人提供替代品，授权给中介也不利；但若提供互补品且中介信息充分，则可能有益。
In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal's interest if the agents supply substitutes. It can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.