An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision
综述不完全契约理论在公共品提供中的应用，先讨论完全信息下的萨缪尔森条件，再分析信息不对称时社会规划者的完全缔约能力与不完全契约的多种来源，最后探讨政治决策者、承诺限制及公私提供选择。
Abstract. This paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided. The paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical Samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods. The rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric informa-tion. It is constituted of two main parts. In the first one, the social planner has complete contracting ability. We discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade-offs it generates. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness. Such incompleteness can emerge from various sources, which we present and discuss. We then study the case of a politically chosen decision-maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups. Finally, we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision. The con-cluding section summarizes the main policy lessons.