Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders?
用动态模型分析外部人通过压低工资争夺内部人地位如何限制内部人从离职成本中获取租金，发现内部人无法每期都获得等于离职成本的租金，且就业水平可能高于完全竞争情形。
The ability of insiders to extract rents associates with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model. The higher these rents, the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and thus to underbid current insiders. As a consequence there is a lower limit to the number of insiders which can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs. The insider model never explains a lower but may result in a higher employment level than in the case where all workers are wage-takers.