Estimating Dynamic Models of Quit Behavior: The Case of Military Reenlistment
用随机动态规划模型估计了再入伍经济激励对军队留任率的影响，发现退休金等补偿有显著作用，且该模型对未来政策变化的预测更合理。
The authors estimate the effect of financial incentives for reenlistment on military retention rates using a stochastic dynamic programming model. They show that the computational burden of the model is relatively low even when estimated on panel data with unobserved heterogeneity. The estimates of the model show strong effects of military compensation, especially of retirement pay, on retention rates. The authors also compare their model with simpler-to-compute models and find that all give approximately the same fit but that their dynamic programming model gives more plausible predictions of policy measures that affect military and civilian compensation at future dates. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.