Private Information and Altruism in Bidding Roscas
研究在私人信息环境下，利他主义如何改善轮转储蓄与信贷协会（Rosca）竞拍的效率，发现有效领导和群体内多样性能增强竞拍者的利他倾向，从而提升资源配置效率。
This article studies how altruism improves allocations in a private information environment where strategic behaviour reduces economic welfare. A theoretical analysis establishes that, in an environment characterised by uncertainty and private information, outcomes of auctions in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Roscas) are more efficient when bidders' preferences are altruistic rather than selfish. A semi-parametric structural estimation technique for Rosca auctions is presented. A parametric structural estimation identifies interactions between group characteristics and bidder altruism. It is found that effective leadership and intra-group diversity are associated with a greater extent of bidder altruism and thus more efficient intra-Rosca allocations. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).