Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market
实证研究英国电力行业市场力量，用直接边际成本和无成本数据方法估算价格-成本加成，发现价格虽高于边际成本但远低于理论预测，并探讨监管、进入威胁和金融合约等解释。
This article presents an empirical study of market power in the British electricity industry. Estimates of price-cost markups are derived using direct measures of marginal cost and several approaches that do not rely on cost data. Since two suppliers facing inelastic demand dominate the industry, most oligopoly models predict prices substantially above marginal costs. All estimates indicate that prices, while higher than marginal costs, are not nearly as high as most theoretical models predict. Regulatory constraints, the threat of entry, and financial contracts between the suppliers and their customers are considered as possible explanations for the observed price levels.