Political Influence and the Banking Sector: Evidence from Korea*
利用韩国银行面板数据，比较政府控制与非政府控制银行的绩效，发现政府控制银行虽贷款利率更低，但不良贷款率更高，效率更低，符合监管宽容和政治贷款预期。
Abstract This paper uses panel data to compare the performance of Korean banks with and without effective government control of the appointment of chief operating officers. A privatization programme succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public, but government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government. Despite charging lower loan rates, banks controlled by government experience higher bad loans ratios. This is in line with expectations of regulatory forbearance and government protection for recipients of political loans. Banks controlled by government are less efficient than privately controlled banks and bad loan variables are higher at banks with lower efficiency scores.