Labor-Tying in a Poor Agrarian Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
通过理论模型和印度农村数据，论证了资本主义农业发展可能反而加强劳动捆绑，而非如通常认为的那样是封建残余。
In this paper we show how tied labor, contrary to its common characterization as a feudal relic and as a symptom of economic stagnation, may actually be strengthened by capitalist agricultural development. We construct a simple two-period theoretical model of a two-tiered labor market to show how the proportional importance of voluntary labor-tying contracts may increase with yield-increasing improvements and with a tightening of the labor market. We then provide in support of these hypotheses some general historical as well as more detailed econometric evidence from a variety of cross-sectional data in rural India.