Managerial Judges: An Economic Analysis of the Judicial Management of Legal Discovery
分析法官限制审前发现程序的规则效果，发现法官通过限制发现能提高早期和解概率并降低预期诉讼成本，同时不损害潜在侵权人的注意激励。
I analyze the effect of procedural rules that permit judges to limit pretrial discovery. In the presence of asymmetric information, a litigant may forgo settlement before discovery if his opponent interprets a serious offer as a sign that her discovery is likely to uncover useful evidence, leading her to invest more in discovery. Furthermore, a litigant may forgo settlement in order to strengthen his or her threat of future discovery. I show that by limiting pretrial discovery, the judge can simultaneously increase the probability of early settlement and reduce expected litigation costs, without reducing potential injurers' incentives to take care.