The Evolution of Managerial Expertise: How Corporate Culture Can Run Amok
研究对工人技能评估不准确如何影响人力资本投资和雇佣决策，发现工人会偏向投资于多数管理者能评估的技能，导致管理专长随时间扭曲，降低产出。
This paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring. Individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate. Dynamically, when workers become managers, managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time, raising investment distortions and reducing output. If firms select managerial expertise strategically, efficient investments can be retrieved when (a) identifying whether workers' skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers, and (b) initial investment distortions are small. Otherwise, such strategic design worsens long-run outcomes. Finally, we determine when short-run affirmative action policies are effective.