Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks
构建了一个最优雇佣合同的一般均衡模型，其中企业比工人更了解劳动的边际产品。研究发现，当存在可观测的总体冲击导致行业间劳动力需求转移时，信息不对称会导致就业减少。
A general equilibrium model of ' optimal employment contracts is developed where firms have better information abotu labor's mar-ginal product than workers. It is optimal for the wage to be tied to the level of employment, to prevent the firm from Flsely stating that the marginal product is low and cutting the wage. It is shown that an observed aggregate shock that leads to an interindustrv shift in labor demand and that would have no effect on total eniplOVIllellt Ln(ler symmetric information leads to a reduction in employment when firms and workers have asymmetric information. I.