Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources
研究私营企业（非上市公司）中所有权与控制权结构（所有者控制vs代理人领导）以及组织层级（扁平vs多层）如何影响资源利用效率，发现不同组合效果差异显著。
Abstract The principal–agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non‐listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 × 2 framework distinguishing owner‐controlled vs. agent‐led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.