Excess Capacity and Collusion
在Benoit和Krishna动态模型框架下，分析企业在价格竞争重复博弈前选择生产规模，研究过剩产能与价格合谋的关系，重点关注企业在价格上默契合谋但投资决策不合作的情形。
In this paper, the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of J. P. Benoit and V. Krishna (1987) in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition. Benoit and Krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria. As the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price, they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price, but not in investment decisions. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.