Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?
研究连锁董事是否与公司治理薄弱相关，发现业绩差的公司更可能有连锁董事，且连锁董事导致CEO薪酬与业绩关联度降低、CEO更替对业绩不敏感，表明连锁董事是治理薄弱的信号。
This paper examines whether the presence of interlocked directors on a board is associated with weak governance. For a sample of 3,566 firm‐years spanning 2001 to 2003, we find that firms with lower industry‐adjusted firm performance are more likely to have interlocked directors. We document that shareholders react negatively to the formation of director interlocks and find that the presence of interlocked directors is associated with lower than optimal pay‐performance sensitivity of CEO incentive compensation and reduced sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Collectively, our results suggest that the presence of interlocked directors is indicative of weak governance.