Wage Indexation, Employment and Inflation
研究了不完全信息和工资谈判下，价格指数化与生产率指数化对通胀和就业的影响，发现生产率指数化在政府信誉好且工会力量弱时能同时稳定价格和就业。
Price versus productivity‐indexing is considered in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information and wage bargaining. In a perfectly price‐indexed economy, the inflationary bias due to lack of credibility is eliminated. However, productivity‐indexing is more appropriate to dampen macroeconomic fluctuations that are caused by real disturbances. We show that productivity‐indexing alone guarantees both price and employment stability, provided the government's reputation is good enough and the union's bargaining power is not too strong. This reduces the degree of price indexation as the union becomes weaker and the government's reputation improves. Productivity‐indexing is desirable with volatile productivity processes and weak unions.