Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium
探讨在古诺均衡的第二阶段，企业前期行为影响边际成本时，提高边际成本方差而不改变总和可降低总生产成本，从而私人和社会最优可能是不对称的。
Oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation, environmental protection, and international competition. We discuss properties of such models when a Cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage. Aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal-cost sum. Therefore, unless the cost of inducing second-stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs, the private and social optima are asymmetric.