Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An Example from the National Football League
研究职业体育联盟如何通过收入分享机制激励球队行为，发现该机制能优化资源分配，但受球队私人非货币收益影响效果减弱，并用NFL数据验证。
We consider a professional sports league's use of a well-defined incentive mechanism, revenue sharing, to encourage the desired behavior of teams in the league. The incentive mechanism works by internalizing externalities that arise across agents (the team owners). We find revenue sharing to be a potentially powerful incentive scheme because in this setting it encourages an optimal distribution of resources among agents. Its effectiveness is mitigated, however, by agents who enjoy private, nonmonetary benefits that are not shared. Using data from the National Football League, we examine how well the propositions explain observed behavior in this relationship.