Optimal Incentive Schemes when Only the Agents' "Best" Output Matters to the Principal
研究委托人只依据代理人中最佳产出（如最先创新、最创意广告）来支付报酬时的最优激励方案，发现与标准模型不同，即使代理人相同，最优激励也可能因人而异，且委托人可能希望增大产出方差或降低产出相关性，即使代理人风险厌恶。
Standard principal-agent models assume that the principal's payoff is a function of the total output of all agents. In many real-world situations, however, the principal's payoff is based solely on the best of the agents' outputs (e.g., the first agent to make an innovation, the most creative advertising campaign, or the cheapest product design). The results obtained from such a model differ from the standard results in a number of respects. For instance, even when identical agents perform identical tasks, the optimal incentive scheme will often differ across agents. Also, the principal may want to increase the variance of the agents' output or reduce the correlation of output across agents, even when the agents are risk averse.