COGNITIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING BIASES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCERS AND USERS OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION*
综述了认知启发式与信息处理偏差的研究，指出人们在判断中会使用简化程序导致系统性偏差，并探讨了这些偏差对财务决策者和信息系统设计者的实际影响。
Abstract The emerging judgment and decision‐making literature indicates that individuals use heuristic procedures that simplify cognitive processing requirements. Judgments (particularly subjective probabilities) are based on limited processing of a proper subset of the available evidence. Tasks potentially calling for complex analysis are reduced to heuristic procedures and efficient information processing may result; these heuristics can, however, produce systematic biases and costly errors in judgment. People also exhibit cognitive biases that systematically affect judgments of statistical properties of random variables. The biases appear to be cognitive in nature and therefore are not due entirely to emotional, motivational, or cost‐of‐processing considerations. For some cognitive biases, a possible explanation has been suggested in the context of a heuristic processing procedure. The objective of this paper is to analyze and synthesize the currently available research on cognitive heuristics and information‐processing biases from the perspective of research and actual financial decision situations. Important implications for users and designers of information systems will be discussed. One generic conclusion from the literature is that individuals appear to be inadequate “intuitive” statisticians; a need for formal judgment and decision aids will become clear.