Paying for observable luck
研究CEO为何因运气（即不可控的可观察冲击）而获得奖励，提出一个隐藏行动模型，其中代理人具有避免破产的隐性激励，解释了薪酬与运气挂钩及不对称薪酬现象。
This article examines why CEOs are rewarded for luck, namely for observable shocks beyond their control. I propose a simple hidden action model where the agent has implicit incentives to avoid bankruptcy. After signing the contract, but before acting, the agent observes a signal on future luck. Implicit incentives are weaker after good news, and call for higher pay‐for‐performance sensitivity in good times. As a result, managerial pay is tied to luck. The model is also consistent with recent evidence of asymmetric pay for luck, that is, a larger exposure of managerial pay to good luck than to bad.