Rewarding improvements: optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation
研究了一个T期合同问题，其中绩效评价是主观且私密的。发现委托人应惩罚未来表现差的代理人，即使过去评价良好；同时代理人应有机会用未来更好表现弥补过去差评。最优激励是不对称的，表现改善的代理人应比表现恶化的获得更多奖励。
We study a T‐period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent for performing poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past; at the same time, the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor evaluations in the past with better performance in the future. Optimal incentives are thus asymmetric. Conditional on the same number of good evaluations, an agent whose performance improves over time should be better rewarded than one whose performance deteriorates.