Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations
用三个博弈模型分析债务人与债权人谈判中的权力分配，发现前两个模型下债权人独占全部剩余，第三个模型则存在多种均衡。有助于理解主权债务谈判的底层逻辑。
The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. This paper explores that assumption by analyzing three game-theoretic models of debt renegotiations. In two of the models, both of which are built on the traditional one-sector growth model, all the subgame-perfect equilibria have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. The third game has many subgame-perfect equilibria that do not have this feature, however. The roles of various assumptions in all three games are examined.