Price-conveyed Information versus Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence
评论了Plott和Sunder（1982）及Friedman等人（1984）的实验，指出其内幕交易者信息分配方式可能导致对理性预期模型优越性的误读，并介绍了Plott和Sunder（1983）的改进实验。
In a recent paper on behavior in experimental securities markets, Plott and Sunder ( 1982) concluded that the rational expectations (RE) model was superior to the traditional prior information (Pl) model in predicting equilibrium prices and holdings. In particular, given a \nmarket with one commodity, three possible states of the world, and three groups of trader "types," each with differing valuations on the commodity per state, initially uninformed traders were able to infer the underlying state from the current market price and act accordingly. In a related paper, Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984) \nobserved that, given the existence of a futures market, the RE model outperformed the PI model in multiperiod, single-commodity markets as well. One source of potential misinterpretation, however, comes from the fact that, although one-half of the traders of each type were informed of the true state at the beginning of each period in Plott and Sunder (1982) and one-third of the traders of each type \nin Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984), the same traders were informed in almost every period. In a more recent paper, Plott and Sunder (1983) constructed markets where all traders received partial information (i.e., given possible states X, Y, and Z, a trader's private information would be either "not X" or "not Y" if the state were Z), \nyet the combinations of traders receiving a certain message in any period were determined randomly.