Super-Experienced Bidders in First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Rules of Thumb, NASH Equilibrium Bidding, and the Winner's Curse
研究发现，超级经验竞拍者虽克服了赢家诅咒，但利润仍低于纳什均衡的50%；他们使用分段线性出价函数，但并非最优反应，说明计算能力有限不能完全解释利润降低。
Super-experienced bidders have learned to overcome the winner's curse but still earn less than 50% of Nash equilibrium profits. Subjects deviate from the complicated Nash strategy, employing piece-wise-linear bid functions that are capable, in principle, of generating an equilibrium with average profits at or above the Nash benchmark. Thus, limited computational abilities alone cannot account for the reduced earnings. Further, subjects are far from best responding within this family of piecewise-linear bid functions. Alternative factors contributing to these reduced earnings are explored. © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology