Deviations from Expected Stakeholder Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance
研究发现高质量公司治理能减少管理者在利益相关者管理上的过度投资，从而降低代理成本；CEO薪酬敏感度越高，偏离预期利益相关者管理的程度越大，而有效的董事会监督能抑制这种偏离。
We propose that high‐quality corporate governance may mitigate agency costs related to value‐destroying investments in stakeholder management (SM). Using an unbalanced panel of 9,051 firm‐year observations for 1,631 firms, we find that deviations from expected stakeholder management (ESM) are increasing in chief executive officer (CEO) portfolio delta. We find, however, that deviations from ESM are negatively related to proxies for effective board monitoring. We also document that the effect of governance mechanisms varies by industry (consumer or industrial orientation) and SM dimension. The results indicate that corporations with good governance pursue shareholder value maximization while constraining unnecessary investment in stakeholders.