Excess information acquisition in auctions
通过实验检验风险中性预期剩余最大化模型，发现竞拍者在多数情况下获取了过多信息，且未获信息者出价显著低于最优水平；后悔规避可解释该行为，而风险厌恶和模糊厌恶不能。
Abstract The acquisition of information is an important feature in most auctions where one’s exact private valuation is unknown ex-ante. We conducted the first experiment in testing a risk-neutral expected surplus maximization model with this feature. Varying the auction format and the cost of information acquisition we found bidders in most cases acquired too much information. Moreover, bidders who remained uninformed placed bids significantly below the optimal bid. The general prediction concerning revenue and efficiency remains valid, as a higher information cost was associated with lower revenues and efficiency rates. We explore different ex-post explanations for the observed behavior and show that regret avoidance can explain the data while risk aversion and ambiguity aversion cannot.