Pleasures of Cockaigne: Quality Gaps, Market Structure, and the Amount of Grading
研究高质量生产者何时不愿自愿分级而低质量企业愿意，以及市场结构如何影响分级决策，发现竞争行业分级数量最优，而有限市场份额企业会导致过度分级。
Abstract The article explores under what circumstances high‐quality producers would not voluntarily submit to grading when low‐quality firms would readily do so and under what conditions high‐quality firms would have a lesser proportion of their output graded than would their low‐quality counterparts. It also investigates how market structure affects the decison to grade, establishing that a competitive industry carries out the optimal amount of grading. When some firms have finite market shares, the industry engages in excessive grading.