A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The ‘‘Boomerang'’ Effect and Grant‐Back Clauses*
构建了一个不完全契约模型，分析许可对创新市场研发竞争的动态影响，并解释回授条款如何缓解未来竞争带来的扭曲，同时评估反垄断中关于回授条款抑制研发激励的论点。
This article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed ‘‘grant‐back'’ clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant‐back clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant‐back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.