The Value of Building Codes
通过双重道德风险模型，研究了建筑规范对建造者安全质量和购买者谨慎程度的影响，发现规范通常未采用高效技术，而合同机制更有效。
We present a double moral hazard model to study the impact of building codes on the safety/quality level chosen by the builder and the level of care expended by the buyer. We show that codes can be a mechanism to implement the first‐best solution provided: (1) The code prescribes the optimum safety level, (2) The code uses the efficient technology to achieve the optimum safety level, and (3) The courts use Negligence Rule as the liability rule. We argue, however, that codes in general do not use the efficient technology. We provide an alternative mechanism to implement the first‐best solution. This mechanism is a contract between the builder and the buyer that specifies the level of safety jquality to be expended by the builder. We prove that the contract is a more effective and more efficient mechanism than are the building codes.