Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
研究由有限寿命但任期较长的代理人序列管理的组织中的合作行为，证明在重叠世代重复博弈中，只要寿命和重叠期足够长，任何互利结果都可近似维持，且无需对阶段博弈做额外假设。
The present paper tries to explain cooperative behaviour in an organization run by a sequence of long- but finitely-lived agents. We show that the Folk Theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely-lived players; any mutually beneficial outcome can approximately be sustained if the player's life span and the overlapping periods are long enough. The result is stronger than the usual Folk Theorems in that it employs no assumption on the stage game, such as the full dimensionality of payoff set or multiplicity of equilibria.