A comparison of Japanese and U.S. firms completing initial public offerings
通过问卷调查比较日美两国刚完成IPO的企业，发现日本企业更少上市、更年长更大、更由创始人领导，决策风格和投资策略也与美国企业显著不同。
We set out to examine firms breaking into the top tier of for-profit companies in the U.S. and Japan to find differences across the two groups. To accomplish this, we conducted a questionnaire survey of companies that had recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in each country and compared them on characteristics frequently associated with new firms. As we expected, even when the different sizes of the two economies were taken into account, there were considerably fewer listings in Japan than in the U.S. One reason for this is that the listing requirements for young Japanese firms, although not stricter, are much more strictly enforced. Hence, fewer Japanese firms are able to list. Our results show that the Japanese firms were markedly different from their U.S. counterparts on several characteristics. They tended to be older and larger, which is consistent with more stringent listing requirements in Japan. They were also much more often led by their original founders. This is a surprising result given that the Japanese firms, being older, had longer to lose their founders. When a successor to the founder was president, it was much more often a relative of the founder than in the U.S. The Japanese founders rated themselves higher on relatively emotional characteristics, such as aggressiveness, paternalism, and charisma than did either the U.S. presidents or the Japanese nonfounder presidents. The Japanese firms relied solely on the president for decision-making prior to the IPO more often than the U.S. firms did. However, the Japanese firms also moved in greater numbers to group decision-making around the time of the IPO. The post-IPO investment strategies of the Japanese firms were characterized by a focus on new product development, an increase in R&D spending, and investment in the company's capital plant. In contrast, the U.S. firms reported more interest in exploiting their existing market and buying other companies, usually leaving R&D spending at its pre-IPO level. Overall, it is surprising that on many characteristics, the Japanese IPOs tended to fall more to the extreme associated with new companies than did the U.S. firms. They were dominated by founder influence, the founders were apparently highly emotional, their management style was initially autocratic, and their strategies targeted innovation and internal development as avenues to growth. This pattern is consistent with a prior hypothesis that the lack of structural support for new firms in Japan results in only the most extreme personalities pursuing and succeeding in company formation. For researchers, a significant implication of this research is that Japanese ventures may not behave according to the same rules as U.S. ventures. Research samples that fail to distinguish nationality may obscure cross-regional variations. For practitioners, the major lesson is that a Japanese venture is likely to be much different from one in the U.S. Dealing with one is probably even more unlike dealing with an established company than working with a U.S. start-up might be.