新股发行公告前的内幕交易

Insider Trading before New Issue Announcements

Financial Management · 1991
被引 235 · 同刊同年前 6%
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究发现,公司内部人在普通股和可转债发行公告前几个月平均是净卖出者,而纯债券发行前无异常交易,说明法律和市场惩罚未能有效阻止内幕交易。

Abstract

On average, insiders are net sellers of their firms' common stock for several months before announcements of new common stock and convertible debt issues. There is no evidence of abnormal insider trading before announcements of straight debt issues. These results suggest that the prospect of legal and market penalties does not deter a significant amount of insider trading before new issue announcements, and are consistent with the hypothesis that managers have superior information that is conveyed to the market through new equity issues.

内幕交易新股发行公告内部人交易信息优势