为忠诚付费:寡头市场中的产品捆绑

PAYING FOR LOYALTY: PRODUCT BUNDLING IN OLIGOPOLY*

Journal of Industrial Economics · 2006
被引 117 · 同刊同年前 9%
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了零售商通过捆绑折扣吸引顾客,发现这种策略虽让合作企业获利,但损害了其他企业和偏好差异大的消费者,最终导致消费者选择次优品牌组合。

Abstract

In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied brands continue to set independently. We show that a pair of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of other firms and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling arrangements, there are no beneficiaries and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub-optimal brand mix.

产品捆绑寡头垄断捆绑折扣品牌联盟