Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings
利用高管短期奖金计划的机密数据，研究高管如何操纵盈余以最大化奖金现值，发现当奖金达到上限时高管会调低盈余，但未发现盈余低于奖金下限时调低盈余的证据。
Using confidential data of executive-specific short-term bonus plans, we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments. As such, this paper extends the work of Healy (1985). Like Healy, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum. Unlike Healy, we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus. We demonstrate that Healy's results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology.