Price Trends at Livestock Auctions
研究拍卖中风险规避竞拍者的自我歧视行为如何导致质量调整后的价格随拍卖进程下降，并用牛犊销售数据验证，讨论对拍卖定价效率和公平性的影响。
Abstract Auction bidders may pursue a large number of reasonable bidding strategies, including those that are risk‐neutral and risk‐averse. Risk‐averse bidders are especially tempted by the auction process to discriminate against themselves, that is, to offer prices close to their reservation prices or target prices. Self‐discrimination, in turn, usually implies that quality‐corrected prices of individual lots trend downward as the sale proceeds. The empirical evidence for downtrending prices at selected yearling steer sales is examined. Implications are then drawn for auction pricing efficiency and equity.