Internal Competition for Corporate Resources and Incentives in Teams
指出，当企业可分解为两个产出可观察的独立团队时，利润分享与团队间内部资源竞争相结合能解决搭便车问题，并据此内生化了企业组织结构的选择。
Invoking thefree-rider problem in teams, many observersfind profit sharing in large organizations puzzling, because it should have negligible incentive effects. We show that $a firm can be decomposed into two separate teams whose outputs can be observed, thenprofit sharing combined with competition between these two teamsfor internal resourcesfrequently solves thefree-rider problem. Using this result, we endogenize thefirm's organizational structure and show that in the presence of economies of scale, small firms tend to organize as unita~y firms, while largefirms choose the multidivisional organizationalform.