Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale
分析销售前获取信息（如预知或提升价值）的动机，以及自愿与强制披露的影响。模型发现自愿披露导致过度获取信息，强制披露对卖家有利，但买家可能需要沉默权以激励获取社会所需信息。
This article analyzes incentives to acquire information about the value of things before sales transactions, and voluntary versus required disclosure of such information. Two distinctions are emphasized: whether information is mere foreknowledge or instead can raise value -- has social value; and whether it is sellers or buyers who decide to acquire information. The main conclusions in the model are that voluntary disclosure results in socially excessive incentives to acquire information; mandatory disclosure is socially desirable for sellers; but for buyers, the freedom to keep silent may be needed to spur acquisition of socially desirable information.