Collusive Market Structure Under Learning-By-Doing and Increasing Returns
分析干中学和规模报酬递增对市场结构的影响，发现干中学不削弱合谋可行性，而期内规模报酬递增会削弱；在合谋后进入模型中，干学不影响集中度，规模经济提高集中度。
Learning-by-doing and increasing returns are often perceived to have similar implications for market structure and conduct. We analyse this in the context of an infinite-horizon price-setting game. Learning is shown to not reduce the viability of market-sharing collusion between a given number of firms, whereas intra-period increasing returns invariably does. We subsequently develop a model where the number of active firms is determined endogenously, under the assumption that the post-entry game is collusive. In this model, learning has no effect on concentration, while scale economies increase concentration.