Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
推导了买家无法事先观察产品质量的市场中的均衡价格-质量关系，发现高质量产品以高于成本的溢价出售，这既防止了卖家降低质量，也补偿了其声誉投资，并分析了消费者信息改善和最低质量标准的影响。
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.